Canada’s Transportation Safety Board has revealed that OceanGate’s Titan submersible operated without proper oversight from the federal government, despite engaging with multiple federal agencies. The report contains six recommendations aimed at addressing regulatory gaps and enhancing safety within the submersible industry. It was made public just one day before the third anniversary of Titan’s final voyage.
Chair of the TSB, Yoan Marier, emphasized the lack of coordination among various federal government bodies concerning critical information related to the Titan’s operation. This resulted in the submersible continuing to function in Canada without adequate regulatory supervision. The investigation highlighted that OceanGate had discussions with officials from nine federal agencies or departments, but crucial details were not effectively communicated to Transport Canada, hindering a comprehensive understanding of operational risks.
Tragically, during the submersible’s descent to the Titanic wreckage, five individuals, including OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, met a fatal end when the carbon fiber hull of the Titan imploded. What initially began as an adventurous venture for tourism culminated in an international search effort and intense scrutiny of a company and its founder who disregarded industry norms and expert advice in the pursuit of innovation.
Concerns about OceanGate were first raised in 2019 when the company engaged with Transport Canada and Parks Canada regarding permissions for Titanic expeditions from Newfoundland. In 2021, discussions began with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) for potential collaborations in scientific research focused on conservation areas along Canada’s east coast. DFO provided a letter of support to assist OceanGate in obtaining approvals from Global Affairs Canada and the Canada Border Services Agency.
In July 2021, a DFO employee participated in a mission with OceanGate and raised red flags upon return. Issues highlighted included the lack of regulatory approval or certification for the Titan, the use of unconventional materials in its construction, and the absence of insurance coverage. While these concerns were escalated within DFO, they were not shared with Transport Canada, depriving the latter of crucial information to take appropriate action.
The TSB report, echoing findings from the U.S. Coast Guard’s marine board of investigation in 2024, identified design flaws in the Titan, particularly with its cylindrical carbon fiber hull that compromised its ability to withstand deep-sea pressures. The investigation suggested that the hull likely weakened with each dive, despite the presence of detection systems that failed to prevent the catastrophic implosion.
Notably, the report clarified that the issues with OceanGate were specific to the company and did not reflect broader deficiencies in the submersible industry. It underscored the company’s culture that prioritized innovation over safety, leading to the dismissal or departure of employees who raised safety concerns, including former director of operations David Lochridge.
As the investigation shed light on these critical aspects, it emphasized the need for improved coordination and oversight to prevent similar incidents in the future.